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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Declaratory Judgments-Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts.
The first important question to arise under the recently enacted
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act' is one of jurisdiction. In the ab-
sence of express provision to the contrary,2 it is generally held that
declaratory judgment acts do not enlarge a court's jurisdiction as to
parties and subject-matter of a suit.3 Jurisdiction is a preliminary mat-
ter to be determined according to prevailing rules. Thus if parties
of diverse citizenship are engaged in an actual controversy over property
exceeding $3,000.00 in value, such a case would be within a federal
court's jurisdiction 4 for purposes of a declaratory judgment suit. If
the value of the property is less than $3,000.00, it would not.8 Similarly,
if jurisdiction hinges on whether a given question is a "federal question,"
this ought to be decided in the affirmative 6 in order to be eligible for a
declaratory judgment.
A more difficult problem is presented when the question is admit-
tedly a "federal question," arising under an Act of Congress, which
act, however, prescribes a special procedure. For example, a labor
union in Illinois sought a declaration of its rights under the famous
Sec. 7 (a) of the N.I.R.A.1 The N.I.R.A. provides that proceedings
to enforce the Act shall be instituted by or under the direction of the
Attorney-General. 8  The court dismissed the suit, holding that it was
without jurisdiction to entertain a private suit.0 The court relied upon
a similar construction of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law,'0 and upon
148 STAT. 955,28 U. S. C. A. §400 (1934).
2 The major provision of the federal statute merely declares, "In cases of actual
controversy the courts of the United States . . . shall have power to declare rights
and other legal relations of any interested party petitioning for such declaration,
whether or not further relief is or could be prayed." Declaratory Judgment Act,
supra note 1.8 BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934) 135 et seq.
'18 STAT. 470 (1875), 28 U. S. C. A. §41 (1927) ; General Outdoor Advertis-
ing Co. v. Williams, 9 F. (2d) 165 (D. Mass. 1925); Home Life Insurance Co.
v. Sipp, 11 F. (2d) 474 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1926).
'Supra note 4.
818 STAT. 470 (1875), 28 U. S. C. A. §41 (1927) ; Hays v. Port of Seattle, 251
U. S. 233, 40 Sup. Ct. 125, 64 L. ed. 243 (1920) affiring 226 Fed. 287 (1915) ;
Miss. Power & Light Co. v. City of Jackson, 9 F. Supp. 564 (S. D. Miss. 1935)
(jurisdiction in suit for declaratory judgment denied because the subject matter
of the suit, an intrastate utilities rate controversy, had by statute been withdrawn
from federal jurisdiction).
'48 STAT. 198 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §707 (a) (1934) (providing for collective
bargaining).
848 STAT. 196 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §703 (c) (1934) It shall be the
duty of the several district attorneys of the United States, under the direction of
the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain
... violations.')
' Hary v. United Electric Coal Co., 8 F. Supp. 655 (E. D. Ill. 1934).
"
8Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459, 37 Sup. Ct. 718, 61 L. ed. 1256
(1916) (Petitioner sought to enjoin concerted action to prevent use of nonunion-
made materials manufactured in other states. Suit dismissed, Justices McKenna,
NOTES AND COMMENTS
the assumption that Congress in enacting the N.I.R.A. must have
adopted that result."
A decision to the contrary was made in Michigan. Certain milk
distributors who were being harassed by administrative officials for
non-compliance with regulations promulgated under the A.A.A. sought
a declaratory judgment of their duties. The A.A.A. contains a pro-
vision similar to the N. I. R. A. and the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, pro-
viding that enforcement proceedings shall be instituted by the Attorney-
General.' 2 In this case the court, without discussing the question of
jurisdiction, ruled that the petitioner was entitled to a declaratory
judgment.' 3
These two cases may be distinguished in one respect. In the N.I.R.A.
case the petitioner was definitely seeking to determine what rights had
affirmatively risen by virtue of the act.' 4 In the A.A.A. case the peti-
tioner, far from seeking to discover any right, was interested rather in
the negative aspect; that is, whether the law imposed any new duties
upon him.15 However, in substance, the two petitioners were equally
interested parties seeking a declaration of legal relations created by a
federal statute.
Which case presents the preferable attitude? It is suggested that
there is a valid distinction between a suit in which the subject matter
and parties could never be within the federal jurisdiction and a suit
in which the whole problem hinges on an Act of Congress which ad-
mittedly would present a proper federal question if only the suit were
instituted by the Attorney-0eneral. Further, it is open to serious ques-
tion whether a declaration of private rights is within the conception of
Congress as to what should constitute enforcement by the government.
At the time of the enactment of the Sherman Act, no such question
could have arisen for declaratory judgments were then unknowp
in America. The "New Deal" statutes raise a host of problems the
Pitney, Van Devanter, and McReynolds dissenting.) The Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. §4 (1927), was amended in 1914, 38 STAT.
737 (1894), 15 U. S. C. A. §4 (1927), extending the right of injunctive relief to
private persons threatened with special damage.
Progressive Miners of America v. Peabody Coal Co., 7 F. Supp. 340 (E. D.
Ill. 1934). However, in Yarnell v. Hillsborough Packing Co., 70 F. (2d) 435
(C. C. A. 5th, 1934), the court entertained an injunction suit brought by citrus
fruit growers against an A. A. A. control board and denied relief on the merits
of the case without discussing the question of jurisdiction.
248 STAT. 37 (1933), 7 U. S. C. A. §610 (h) (1934).
Black v. Little, 8 F. Supp. 867 (E. D. Mich. 1934).
"Hary v. United Electric Coal Co., 8 F. Supp. 655 (E. D. Ill. 1934) (petitioner
sought to determine what new rights of collective bargaining had been granted
to labor under §7 (a) of the N. I. R. A.).
' Black v. Little, 8 F. Supp. 867 (E. D. Mich. 1934) (petitioner sought to
determine whether the A. A. A. required intrastate milk distributors to conform
to licensing requirements of A. A. A. boards.).
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solution of which may change the entire course of government and in-
dustry. If the N.I.R.A. or the A.A.A. is to be interpreted by any
court, that is, if any court ever has jurisdiction, it will be a federal
court. No one can be a more interested party than one whom the stat-
utes and codes in express terms purport to affect. It is frequently said
that an interest in security, the preservation of social equilibrium, and
an avoidance of unnecessary disputes underlie the declaratory judg-
ment acts. Therefore, when jurisdiction hinges on the question as to
who may sue under a given statute, it would seem more in keeping with
the appropriate social policy to hold a private suit sufficient for a
declaratory judgment.
HARRY W. McGALLIARD.
Evidence-Hearsay-Admissibility of Medical Records.
Plaintiff brought an action under a war risk policy to recover for
alleged total disability. The defense introduced evidence of a position
of employment formerly held by the plaintiff, and also a notation, made
by a physician, since deceased, upon the plaintiff's application for such
employment reading as follows, "Showing no disease with heart and
lungs o.k. application accepted". This latter was objected to as hear-
say. Held, that the evidence was properly admitted as part of the res
gestae of plaintiff's applying for employment.1
The most common situation in which the admissibility of medical
records has been litigated is that involving medical history charts and
other records of hospitals. Such records, when containing communi-
cations made by a patient to his physician for the purpose of treatment,
are protected by the statutory physician-patient privilege,2 even though
the records be kept pursuant to some legal requirement.3 However, once
'Jennings v. United States, 73 F. (2d) 470 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934).
'Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Trustees of Mich. Asylum
for the Insane, 178 Mich. 193, 144 N. W. 538 (1913) (writ of mandamus to
permit examination of the records of insane asylum denied); Price v. Standard
Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 90 Minn. 264, 95 N. W. 1118 (1903) (hospital records denied
admission as evidence) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Swain, 149 Miss. 455, 115
So. 555, 557 (1928) ("The records consisted of statements of the physician who
treated [insured] while a patient in the hospital. The relation of physician and
patient exists between the physician who has cause to make an examination and
diagnosis of him in a hospital, as well as outside of a hospital, or whether a pay
patient or charity patient, and such physician may not deliver his testimony so
acquired in open court or have it written down in so-called reports for con-
sideration as evidence in contravention of our privileged communication statute.") ;
Toole v. Franklin Inv. Co., 158 Wash. 696, 291 Pac. 1101 (1930) commented upon
(1930) 5 TE.mp. L. Q. 300.
It should be noted that the privilege granted by the North Carolina statute is not
absolute. N. C. CODE Amr. (Michie, 1931) §1798 contains this proviso : "That the
presiding judge of a superior court may compel such a disclosure, if in his
opinion it is necessary to a proper administration of justice."
'Smart v. Kansas City,. 208 Mo. 162, 105 S. W. 709 (1907).
